University of Wollongong

Research Online
Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts Papers

Faculty of Arts, Social Sciences & Humanities

1-1-2012

From the transcendental to the enactive
Shaun Gallagher
University of Memphis

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers
Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons, and the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Gallagher, Shaun, "From the transcendental to the enactive" (2012). Faculty of Law, Humanities and the
Arts - Papers. 1161.
https://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/1161

Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au

From the transcendental to the enactive
Abstract
Varga (2012) argues that the sense of reality disrupted in various psychopathologies, including
derealization (DR) and depersonalization (DP), is pre-intentional (or in some sense, the product of a more
basic, operative intentionality that is pre-predicative). This moves us away from the more dominant
conceptions of delusion and the loss of sense of reality as problems best explained in terms of
propositional attitudes, like beliefs, or framework propositions (see, e.g., Campbell 2001; Eilan 2000).
Furthermore, Varga suggests a certain triadic structure in which DR/DP affects not just the sense of
reality, but also the sense of self and our intersubjective relations with others. Reality, self, and others are
tied together into a system where psychotic disruptions reverberate across all these dimensions.

Keywords
enactive, transcendental

Disciplines
Arts and Humanities | Law

Publication Details
Gallagher, S. 2012, 'From the transcendental to the enactive', Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, vol.
19, no. 2, pp. 119-121.

This journal article is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/1161

From the Transcendental to the Enactive
Shaun Gallagher

Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, Volume 19, Number 2, June
2012, pp. 119-121 (Article)
Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press

For additional information about this article
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/ppp/summary/v019/19.2.gallagher.html

Access provided by University of Wollongong (8 Apr 2014 22:51 GMT)

From the
Transcendental to
the Enactive
Shaun Gallagher

Keywords: delusion, sense of reality, intersubjectivity,
embodiment

V

arga (2012) argues that the sense of reality disrupted in various psychopathologies, including derealization (DR) and
depersonalization (DP), is pre-intentional (or in
some sense, the product of a more basic, operative intentionality that is pre-predicative). This
moves us away from the more dominant conceptions of delusion and the loss of sense of reality as
problems best explained in terms of propositional
attitudes, like beliefs, or framework propositions
(see, e.g., Campbell 2001; Eilan 2000). Furthermore, Varga suggests a certain triadic structure in
which DR/DP affects not just the sense of reality,
but also the sense of self and our intersubjective
relations with others. Reality, self, and others are
tied together into a system where psychotic disruptions reverberate across all these dimensions.
Varga insightfully appeals to Husserl’s phenomenological conception of transcendental or open
intersubjectivity as a way to show how our relations with others enter into the co-constitution of
reality. One can also appeal to empirical studies to
point in this same direction. I would like to pursue
this idea, briefly, in the spirit of Merleau-Ponty’s
question: “Now if the transcendental is intersubjectivity, how can the borders of the transcendental
© 2012 by The Johns Hopkins University Press

and the empirical help becoming indistinct?” And
his rather dramatically expressed response: “All
of my facticity is reintegrated into subjectivity ….
Thus the transcendental descends into history”
(Merleau-Ponty 1967, 107). It makes perfect sense
to think that whatever one determines to be the
case on transcendental grounds, must also be reflected, if not cashed out, in empirical terms open
to scientific investigation (see Gallagher 2011).1
The empirical studies that I have in mind are
primarily developmental ones concerning joint
attention and secondary intersubjectivity (Trevarthen 1998; Trevarthen and Hubley 1978), and
studies that support the enactive approach to
cognition (e.g., Varela, Thompson, and Rosch
1991). It is clear from the developmental studies that starting even before 9 months of age
infants, who arguably have no concept of belief,
who are pre-linguistic in the standard sense, but
who relate to others primarily through embodied
(sensory–motor) interactions, begin to gain a
basic, pragmatic sense of what counts as real,
significant, and salient, only by attending with
others to those environmental objects and states
of affairs that those others attend to with interest. The meaningful world is carved out of the
physical environment in just those practices and
interactions with others that constitute secondary
intersubjectivity (the empirical counterpart to
Husserl’s open intersubjectivity). These intersub-
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jective practices include not only joint attention,
but those abilities that infants have for grasping
the context-determined intentions of others, and
for participatory sense-making (De Jaegher and
Di Paolo 2007; Gallagher 2009).
Participatory sense-making involves making
sense of the world, a co-constitution of meaning, through active engagement and coordinated
interaction with others. This may take place in
play situations as well as in work situations; it is
basic to action and perception. On the enactive
view, we see the world as meaningful in terms of
what we can do with things, what we can reach
or not reach, what presents as affordances or
disaffordances. Gibson’s notion of affordances is
ecological, which means it points to the fact that
affordances are defined in terms of what we are
capable of doing as embodied agents, and what the
environment offers. That is, it involves both self
and world in their coupled and dynamic relations.
This ecological mix, however, necessarily includes
others, because we surely learn what things mean,
how to handle things, how to deal with things,
and how to value things from the actions of others
and our own interactions with them. The sense
of reality, then, is generated in this, at once, prepredicative, pragmatic, and social milieu.
Importantly, what we see in studies of joint
attention, secondary intersubjectivity, and participatory sense-making pertains not just to infants.
It continues to characterize our interactions with
others and our action-oriented stance toward reality throughout our lifetime, on both pragmatic
and emotional levels. For example, in studies of
object evaluation in adults, the gaze of the other
person toward an object can draw one’s attention to the object. Subjects presented with a face
looking toward (or away from) an object evaluate
the object as more (or less) likeable than those
objects that don’t receive much attention from
others. When you add an emotional expression
to the face, the effect is stronger (Bayliss et al.
2006; 2007). In addition, the quality of the other
person’s movement is important. Seeing another
person act with ease (or without ease) toward an
object will influence one’s feelings about the object
(Hayes et al. 2007). Indeed, my awareness of the
gaze of others toward objects or in joint attention

influences my perception of objects in regard to
motor action, significance, and emotional salience;
the other’s regard will have an effect on the way
I may come to feel about that object, and it may
lead to subsequent action (Becchio, Bertone, and
Castiello 2008; Becchio et al. 2007). Our sense
of what counts as real and what’s significant is
firmly rooted in this pervasive pragmatic and social
frame of reference, which operates as a ‘massive
hermeneutical background’ (Bruner and Kalmar
1998; Gallagher, in press) for our dealings with
the world and with others.
“Firmly rooted,” relatively stable, perhaps even
transcendental, as Varga suggests, but not unassailable or guaranteed, as psychopathology shows.
Varga is right to suggest that purely cognitive accounts of breakdowns like DP and DR in terms
of predicative judgments, beliefs, or propositional
attitudes are inadequate; likewise, purely cognitive
accounts in these terms (and we can add, in terms
of theory of mind) of the generation of this triadic
coupling—self, world, others—are impoverished,
if not distorted, insofar as they ignore the embodied and enactive processes at their root.

Note
1. I note that Husserl makes the same point: “every
analysis or theory of transcendental phenomenology,
including the transcendental theory of the constitution
of an objective world – can be produced in the natural
realm, when we give up the transcendental attitude”
(1970 §57).
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